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If the New Economic Order is to come about,
however slowly and with whatever struggle, it
must largely be built on negotiations based on
mutual interests not shotgun demands. Some,
particularly on the far Left, argue that the possi-
bility of finding such areas of mutual interest in a
still largely capitalist world economy is absolutely
out of the question. Others argue that the world
needs only to recognise its inter-dependence to see
an essential unity of interests sufficient to justify
major realignments which would be in the interests
of all.
To me, both these positions are unrealistic and
unhelpful. They seem at variance with many
important examples of international economic
change in the last few years and at variance with
the facts of how most countries actually operate
in the world arena. These polar positions are also
enervating, in the sense that they sap the energies
and interests of many persons who might other-
wise be considering in a more serious and syste-
matic way the mechanics of changethe basic
question of how one can devise realistic strategies
for effective change within the present chaotic
world situation.
The need for widespread changes on the inter-
national front ought now to be obvious to
everyone in the industrialized countries, as well as
in the rest of the world. The vast majority in the
rich countries have been hit personally in the last
few years by a succession of economic difficulties:
unemployment, inflation, shortages of oil, sugar
and other supplies, several-fold increases in the
prices of oil and oil products. All of these
problems adding up to the worst recession since
the Thirties, are only part of a general world
economic crisis in which domestic problems have
in part been internationally transmitted by a
world economic system which is inflexible and
unfairand unable to eliminate their causes. The
industrialized countries have much to gain simply
from avoiding a repetition of these problems.
Though most people probably have some sense of
the international aspects of these problems, few
have any idea of the order of magnitude of the
losses involved in world recession and thus the
potential additional resources to be gained from
avoiding it. In the OECD countries alone the loss
of production in the last two years from not main-
taining production at its 1963-73 trend rate of
growth is of the order of 10 per cent to 12 per cent
of world GNP, or about $300-$250 billion,
roughly equivalent to the combined annual pro-
duction of Britain and the 13 smallest developed
countries. Add to this the human problems of a
significant part of the estimated 15 million unem-
ployed in the industrialized countries and another
300 million unemployed or underemployed in the
Third World (ILO estimates, 1975), and one has
some indication of the waste and inefficiency of
the existing international economic order.
Of course, it would not be accurate to attribute all
of this to failings of the international system.
Clearly a good part of worldwide recession has
been the result of measures to deal with inflation,
itself fuelled by domestic cost-push pressures, the
spiral of wage demands and the inadequacy of
governments' incomes policies. But at the same
time, one should not underestimate the inter-
national causes, especially the unprecendented
repercussions on the balance of payments of the
major industrialized countries of the 1974
increases in oil and wheat prices, which produced
a challenge to the international trade and mone-
tary system well beyond the capacities of the
existing international institutions to accommodate.
The oil price increases alone added up to perhaps
the biggest single and sudden shift in world
income distribution which the world has ever seen
a shift of spending power to OPEC countries of
about 2 per cent of world GNP, of which about
1+ per cent came from the rich countries and
something under -} per cent from the non-OPEC
Third World. In the end, of course, much of this
was only a potential shift in spending power, with
the actual shifts in expenditure greatly reduced by
recycling back to the rich countries many of the
liquid funds, by price increases of industrial
country exports, and by reductions in the quantity
of oil exported as demand declined due to the
switch to substitutes and the onset of world
recession. Even so, the balance of payments
deficits of a number of the industrialized countries
and many Third World countries were of dimen-
sions never seen before. Although the US and
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OPEC balance of payments greatly benefited, this
did not ease the world adjustment problem nor
affect the deflationary effects elsewhere. In the
OPEC case a good part of the purchasing power
was shifted to a few very rich relatively small
small oil producers, with limited capacity to
increase local demand (except for the bottomless
pit of armaments). In the case of the US, the gain
to the balance of payments did not prevent the
US from embarking on deflationary policies as
part of a strategy to curb inflation.
In part through subsequent changes in inter-
national monetary arangements, the world
economy is beginning to recover. But one is left
wondering how much of the recession was due to
the sheer rapidity of the attempt to shift 2 per cent
of world income from one group to another. What-
ever the exact answer to this difficult question it
is clear that the actual amount redistributed is far
less than the loss from recession. A 10-12 per cent
loss in world production over 1973 and 1974 is at
least five or six times the maximum amount which
might have been redistributed and a much greater
multiple of the amount which actually was. Might
there not have been easier and less costly ways to
achieve the same result?
This essentially is the main argument for the
developed countries taking much more seriously
Third World demands for a New Economic Order.
Orderly changes which ensure continuity of
supplies, reasonably predictable prices, and the
maintenance of full employment, are valuable
economic gains worth paying for with concessions
in other regards. It is in the rich countries interests
to strike these bargains.
The avoidance of world recession should not be
seen merely as a way of maintaining existing levels
of rich country production and consumption for
their own sakelet alone as a simple Keynesian
argument for reflating the world economy follow-
ing the previous patterns of production and con-
sumption within each country. The argument is
that restructuring of production-consumption
patterns is desperately needed within rich and
poor countries alike. In poor countries it is
especially needed to give much greater priority to
the provision of basic needs of all the population,
in rich countries to shift the emphasis away from
'consumerism' and to develop a pattern of life and
participation matched to the individual and social
needs of materially well-off societies. Both
approaches will require major changes in
economic structureinternally as well as inter-
nationally. Development concerns us all.
These adjustments will however be that much
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easier if they can be undertaken in a period of
expansion with declining levels of unemployment
rather than in full recession. It is therefore desir-
able, perhaps even essential, to avoid recession
during the process of international adjustment. In
the present context, this leads to the argument for
"restructuring out of recession". This implies, first,
dealing with the present recession by an inter-
nationally co-ordinated approach. Secondly, it
implies moving out of recession in ways which
simultaneously involve other adjustments in the
pattern of production which will begin to deal
with the underlying inj ustices and gross inequali-
ties of the present world order.
Internationally there will also need to be restruc-
turing. The new economic order, if it is to mean
anything at all, will not just be the old economic
order on better terms, but a fundamental change
in international economic patterns and relation-
shipsto a much greater measure of planning and
integration (nationally and internationally). This
almost certainly should not mean some heavy
handed approach to comprehensive world
economic planning, even if this were politically
feasible. Rather it suggests a fuller range of partial
medium-run government to government agree-
ments covering certain programmes of internal
adjustments co-ordinated internationally in timing
and coverage. Included might be, for instance,
bilateral trade agreements, agreements for a
phased run down of some industries in one
country integrated with shifts of production in this
area to another country and shifts of the labour
force into other activities, co-ordinated approaches
to technological development and transfers of
industrial ownership.
All this will involve new approaches to internal
economic development, within the rich countries
as much as within the poor. And this, perhaps
above all is where the rich countries have them-
selves most to gain. For the demands for a new
international economic order coincide with a wide-
spread sense of crisis within the rich countries
themselvesan awareness of the need for re-
thinking fundamentally the approach to economic
and political and social organization, of the need
to consider what is produced and for what
markets within the rich countries, to take account
of environmental concerns and the quality of life.
In my view these changes will not come in a
blinding flashbut hopefully step by step
advances can be made. If the Third World's
demands for a NIEO move the rich countries
nearer to this, the rich countries may have gained
more than any concessions they may have to
make.
